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ISLAMIC ECUMENISM REDEFINED: A 
HUNGARIAN MUSLIM LEADER’S
 “REFORMED SHARIA” FOR EVERYDAY 
MUSLIMS AND EUROPE
Abstract: This paper explores the idea of a reformed sharia and its potential for 
redefining ecumenism and engagement with everyday Islam in Europe. It builds 
its argument on interviews conducted with the founder of the Hungarian Muslim 
community Balázs Mihálffy. He promotes an ambitious reform project of Islamic 
law, in his 2428-page Quran commentary, and throughout his life trajectory of 
ecumenism and work on sharia. Mihálffy’s understanding of sharia as a solution 
to the predicaments of Islam and Europe, which comes at a critical time, is presen-
ted and analyzed here in both its resources and limits. We also examine his sharia 
claim in the current debates of the anthropology of Islam in Europe, the context 
of Islam in Hungary and the reception of sharia-claims by European lawyers and 
institutions.
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Introduction
The term ecumenism is used here to mean the inclusivist idea or attitude of promo-
ting unity beyond religions, especially of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, on the 
foundation of a common platform rooted in the idea of monotheism. It is endor-
sed by many Muslims, including reformist thinkers and activists. Throughout this 
paper, “ecumenical Islam” will not refer to the dialogical aspect of the relationship 
between faiths, in its narrow sense, although this aspect constitutes a component 
of ecumenism as we envision it here. Interfaith dialogue has been going on in 
Europe for the last forty years or more without any significant result in terms 
of bridging the gap between the different religious communities.1 In this religi-
1  The most recent example of this clash is the debate in France in April 2018 over the “manifest to 
against the new anti-Semitism” in which 300 public intellectuals in France accuse Muslims of anti-
Semitism. These intellectuals include an ex-president, ex-prime ministers and eminent philosophers 
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ous diplomacy, open-minded theologians of the three religions practice a tedious 
inter-religious dialogue, hoping to achieve world peace and build trust between 
different religious communities, while clearly setting the boundaries of interac-
tion and entertaining theologically and politically exclusivist systems.
As Islam became part of Europe, professed by populations, organisations and 
ideas since the 1960s, some Islamic interpretations of the public sphere and fre-
edom clashed with Christian and Jewish religious attitudes on these fundamen-
tal matters for social co-existence. Inter-religious platforms established mostly by 
Christian religious leaders have a hard time changing the relations between com-
munities. There is, however, an increasing demand for ecumenism that can be 
observed in Europe among Muslims. Some young Muslims, either Sufis, social 
workers, interfaith families or simple citizens who feel proximity with Christianity 
or the necessity to get along with it in order to live peacefully in Europe, endorse 
an Islamic ethics that can be labelled as “ecumenical Islam”. Usually, these indi-
viduals are non-practicing Muslims, with loose links to the religious and political 
Islamic institutions. They are to be encountered among “everyday Muslims” or 
among highly educated Muslims or multicultural Muslims, in the form of a uni-
versal discourse or thinking, with very little activities, and their focus is rather on 
the universal/Western/cosmopolitan/liberal mindset. The gap between this “ecu-
menical Islam” and the dominating religious discourses among the Muslim com-
munities is dramatic. To express this ecumenical sensitivity, few Muslim leaders, 
either theologians or intellectuals, strive to craft convincing ideas of a genuine 
ecumenical meeting with the other.
Currently in Europe, this type of ecumenical thinking is challenged by at least 
two major problems: first, one can list Islamist violence in Europe, and the radi-
calisation of a part of the Muslim community, frustrated by marginalization and 
framed by Islamism, increasing mistrust between Europe and Islam, with the con-
sequence that many Europeans lost faith in the capacity of Muslim leaders to 
respond to the violence caused by radical Muslims.  Second, the core of Islam 
is sharia, a set of legal and ethical rules stated or inspired by the foundational 
texts of Islam. Sharia establishes the boundaries of dealing with non-Muslims and 
the behavioural norms in diverse social, economic and political aspects of public, 
as well as private matters, making an “ecumenical life” restrained if not banned 
according to the dominating interpretations of sharia.
Demand for an “ecumenical Islam” thus hopes for the emergence of reformist 
Muslims sufficiently credible in their community and authentically open to the 
values of liberal democracy in order to integrate Muslim communities in its struc-
tures and discourses. Above all, they are expected to solve the two major prob-
lems of the clash between Islam and Europe, namely violence and sharia. This 
demand is equally intensive among the young generations of Muslims in Europe 
and ruling elites in most European countries. 
Ecumenism in Islam, as a quest for unity beyond religions, has been studied by 
many researchers focusing on esoteric Sufism. This is, however, a marginal trend 
within Sufism and current Islam in general, dominated by legal and theological 
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interpretations, framed in global or local political claims. Few contemporary refor-
mists, who are embedded in the legal enterprise of Islam or at least committed to 
it and yet developing ecumenical views, attracted research and attention in the 
West. Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naʿim, a Sudanese professor of Islamic law at Emory 
University studied Mahmud Muhammad Taha (1909-1985), a Sudanese liberal 
Muslim reformist and the way he reinterprets the law about the dhimmis, as parti-
cular to the context of Medina (622-632), non-universal in principle, and promotes 
co-existence with Christians in Sudan on the model of the Meccan period (610-
622), as being universal and reflecting ethical values.2 In 1997, Ataullah Siddiqui 
examined the work of the Tunisian reformist Mohamed Talbi (1921-2017), and his 
attempt to reconsider the notion of umma, community to include non-Muslims, 
on the model of the constitution of Medina.3 More recently, and in the context 
of post-2011 Egypt, Dominique Avon (France) and Amin Elias (Lebanon) inves-
tigated the oeuvre of Gamal al-Banna, an Egyptian reformist (1920-2013) who 
attempted to review the sources of Islamic law in order to incorporate freedom 
for non-believers and secularism, considering the Copts as brothers in citizenship 
and religion.4
It must be noted that in Islamic studies and social sciences, scholars agree that 
sharia is an equivocal term that could convey different meanings in different cont-
exts. Two recent and authoritative works confirmed this widely held view. The 
first is edited by Baudouin Dupret La charia aujourd’hui: usages de la référence au 
droit islamique5 and the second is edited by Timothy P. Daniels Sharia Dynamics: 
Islamic Law and Sociopolitical Processes.6 They both show that the uses and dyna-
mics of sharia vary considerably according to its different settings; they are more 
flexible in pluralistic contexts such as Malaysia and Indonesia, more rigid in 
Pakistan and in Arab Islamist movements, while liberal in the fields of finance or 
in the fatwas issued in the period of the “Arab Spring”. None of the researchers 
who contributed to these two books intended to argue that sharia is somewhere 
one and definite and then it adapts to different contexts, although titles can lend 
to this understanding. On the contrary, their idea is that it is impossible to identify 
one sharia today and that there are sharias according to the context and the autho-
rity that claims it, without really resembling the classical sharia, because that did 
not have a definite form either. 
Up to now, far too little attention has been devoted to “ecumenical Islam” 
which operates a redefinition of sharia in order to incorporate European legal sys-
tems. Much uncertainty still exists about the capacity of Muslim leaders to res-
hape and integrate sharia that vary in a secularist European context. This paper 
gives an account of an attempt by a Hungarian Muslim leader, Balázs Mihálffy to 
redefine sharia for Europe, putting it into the perspective of the Muslim presence 
in Europe in general. 
2  An-naʻim 1988.
3  Siddiqui 1997.
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1. The perception of ecumenism among Hungarian Muslims 
Mihálffy became acquainted with Islam while sharing a room with a Sudanese 
student in a university dormitory in Hungary. Having spent years in Africa and 
after gaining a higher degree from the Azhar university that qualified him as a 
shaykh, Mihálffy returned to Hungary where he founded the Hungarian Muslim 
Community in the late 1980s. Being an agricultural engineer prompted him to 
dedicate special attention to halal labelling for which he set up a certifying enter-
prise seated in Vienna. He elaborated an inclusive understanding of halal based 
on ethics, focusing on the purpose of the notion: producing, selling and consu-
ming food that does good to the human body and corresponds to natural law 
in its Islamic understanding. Answering the question of whether branding in 
itself causes segregation, Mihálffy proposed that corresponding to a certain reli-
gious criterion can be considered as an additional, beneficent characteristic of a 
food product offered to the wider public without making the labelling central. 
Similarly, he understands hijab as a way of dressing that does not attract attention 
but fully fits into the environment and is modest at the same time.7 Mihálffy is a 
regular guest at round table discussions welcomed by the Jesuit-run Párbeszéd 
Háza (The House of Dialogue) in Budapest and Miklós Beer Bishop of Vác among 
others. However, his position and views do not resonate with the current trends 
among Hungarian Muslims. To illustrate their perception of integration and sharia 
we quote some relevant fatwas available on the most popular website, iszlam.com 
run by the biggest Hungarian Muslim community, the Organization of Muslims 
in Hungary (Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza).
The first of the fatwas studied deals with the question of religious education. 
On this the ruling is strict: Muslim students have to be exempted from any reli-
gious or ethics classes other than Islamic.8 This approach suggests a straightfor-
ward ideological separation from the majority society. Another fatwa states that 
holidays rooted in the Christian tradition that gained social, cultural importance 
such as All Saints’ Day are also to be avoided as they are non-Islamic. The rea-
soning concludes with a fundamentalist statement: “It is a good for Muslims to 
pray for Muslims. However, praying for non-Muslims is not possible.”9 The same 
conservative, fundamentalist approach is reflected in the fatwa arguing against 
greeting or participating “in the religious festivals of idolaters and the People 
of Book.” This opinion references Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim, 
7  Interview conducted by the authors of the present article with Balázs Mihálffy
8  A muszlim családoknak hogyan kell eljárniuk a bevezetendő kötelező iskolai hitoktatással kapc-
solatban? [What must Muslin families do in connection with the compulsory religious education to 
be introduced in the schools?] http://iszlam.com/kerdes-valasz/vallasi-velemenyek-fatwak/item/2085-
hitoktatas (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
9  Általános kérdések és válaszok az iszlámmal kapcsolatban. [General questions and answers on 
Islam] http://iszlam.com/kerdes-valasz/altalanos-kerdesek/item/2099-altalanos-kerdesek-es-valaszok-
az-iszlammal-kapcsolatban (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
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legal scholars of the 14th century who are considered as religious authorities of the 
Salafi interpretation of Islam.10 
Regarding the funeral of non-Muslim parents or close relatives, the fatwa 
prompts further alienation from the majority saying that Muslims may attend 
them “but they should not take part in prayers and in other religious rituals.11 
In the perception of Hungarian Muslim leaders, social customs and norms are 
subordinated to religious regulations as reflected in the following fatwa: “Based 
on the beliefs and behaviours of the Islamic religion and what is explained above, 
attending swimming pools and beaches for children older than 5 to 6 years is not 
recommended. After reaching adolescence, it is strongly contraindicated.”12
Another set of legal opinions deals with economic issues and displays some 
degree of flexibility in as much as it serves the needs and prosperity of Muslims. It 
argues that if prohibiting a loan with interest “would deprive Muslims of having 
an opportunity to have their own home and family, which is a basic necessity it 
is permissible, since here the Muslim ‘feeds’ the usury (he pays the interest) and 
does not ‘eat’ it (he does not benefit from the interest). The original ban refers to 
the beneficiary of the interest rather than to its payer, as explained in the Quran. 
[In it] both the use and the taking of interest are prohibited, in order to block the 
leeway for everyone and not to leave any opportunity for abuse.”13 In this reaso-
ning the idea of interest, maṣlaḥa can be detected. It does not discard or reinterpret 
the relevant sharia ruling but rather creates a hierarchy of priorities in which reli-
gious ethics is substituted by moral economy.
On iszlam.com we can read about Islamic identity defined as holistic, universal 
and marked by distinguished characteristics. “It specifies the purpose, the func-
tion and the distant purpose [of the believers] precisely and clearly (…) [It] pro-
vides [them] with the basic elements of survival and preserves their culture and 
ideology so they do not get absorbed into other nations (…) Forced assimilation 
may weaken the Islamic identity for certain communities, but it is quite certain 
that the process will not happen, since this religion is guarded by Allah, and Allah 
has guaranteed its preservation (…) Muslims are obliged to stick to this identity, 
and not allowed to leave it.” This identity is the only source of pride and creates a 
close bond and loyalty between the believers.14  
10  Gratuláció a nem-muszlimoknak, ünnepeik alkalmából. [Greetings to non-Muslims on the occa-
sion of their feast days] http://iszlam.com/kerdes-valasz/altalanos-kerdesek/item/1739-gratulacio-a-
nem-muszlimoknak-unnepeik-alkalmabol (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
11  Részvétel a nem-muszlim rokonok temetkezési szertartásában. [Participation in the funeral cer-
emonies of non-Muslim relatives] http://iszlam.com/kerdes-valasz/altalanos-kerdesek/item/1742-resz-
vetelanem-muszlimrokonoktemetkezesiszertartasaban (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
12  Úszás serdülőkort elért gyermekek esetében. [Swimming for children who have reached ado-
lescence] http://iszlam.com/kerdes-valasz/vallasi-velemenyek-fatwak/item/2089-uszas-serdulokort-
elert-gyermekek-eseteben (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
13  Kamatozó banki kölcsönből vásárolt magán ingatlan esete nem iszlám országban. [The case of 
private property bought with interest-paying bank loans in a non-Islamic country] http://iszlam.
com/kerdes-valasz/altalanos-kerdesek/item/1738-kamatozobankikolcsonbolvasaroltmaganingatlane-
setenemiszlamorszagban (Accessed on 25. 05. 2018)
14  A muszlim identitás és megőrzése Nyugaton. [Muslim identity and its preservation in the 
West] http://iszlam.com/iszlam-az-elet-vallasa/iszlam-es-nyugat/item/1317-a-muszlim-identitas-es-
megorzese-nyugaton (Accessed on 27. 05. 2018)
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About religious diversity and dialogue an article entitled “The culture of tole-
rance as perceived by Muslims” explains that “Religious difference is Allah’s will 
in this world. Therefore, there is no point in trying to make the whole earth follow 
a particular religion (...) According to Islam, no one is responsible for the choice 
of religion for others, since it is an individual decision, and only God will judge 
people for the correctness of their religion (...) those who are subject to Allah, can-
not go beyond the civilized framework of dialogue or resort to violence.15 This 
understanding of tolerance cautiously maintains the supremacy of Islam, while 
stating that other religions are tolerated by Allah and therefore Muslims are not 
allowed to use violence in order to spread Islam, however non-Muslims have to 
face God’s judgement regarding their beliefs.
Another article entitled “Muslim identity and its preservation in the West” sets 
the principles for social (interfaith) dialogue as follows:
1. Emphasizing common human denominators and human values instead of 
differences.
2. Emphasizing dialogue and co-operation between civilizations instead of 
clashing with civilizations
3. Use of moderate communication as it is a characteristic of the identity of the 
Muslim umma (community) 
4. Applying an intellectual, objective, and tactful tone rather than impulsive, 
confrontational speech
5. Showing readiness to compromise in the discourse between the individual 
and the society in order to deepen the organic belonging of the Muslim indi-
vidual to the society
6. Showing pride in the [Muslim] identity: “And who is better in speech than 
one who invites to Allah and does righteousness and says, ‘Indeed, I am of the 
Muslims’.” (Quran 41:33)16
Abdul-Fattah Munif, the author of the article cited above is actively engaged 
in interfaith dialogue and is a regular guest at various forums.17 His theoretical 
summary is a tactical guideline, and mixture of lenience and flexibility as far as 
communication is concerned and of proselytism and feeling of superiority as 
a Muslim. However, the fatwas published at the same website do not reflect a 
15  A tolerancia kultúrája a muszlimoknál. [The culture of tolerance among Muslims] http://iszlam.
com/iszlam-az-elet-vallasa/iszlam-es-nyugat/item/1235-a-tolerancia-kulturaja-a-muszlimoknal 
(Accessed on 28. 05. 2018)
16  A muszlim identitás és megőrzése Nyugaton. [Muslim identity and its preservation in the 
West] http://iszlam.com/iszlam-az-elet-vallasa/iszlam-es-nyugat/item/1317-a-muszlim-identitas-es-
megorzese-nyugaton (Accessed on 27. 05. 2018)
17  “Közelkép az iszlámról” – Könyvbemutatót tartottak a Párbeszéd Házában. [“Close-up of Islam” 
– Book launch held in the House of Dialogue] http://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/-kozelkep-az-iszlam-
rol-konyvbemutatot-tartottak-parbeszed-hazaban/ (Accessed on 26. 05. 2018)
Terézvárosi vallásközi konferencia a misztikáról. [Interfaith conference in Terézváros on mysticism] 
https://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/a-misztikarol-beszelgettek-terezvarosi-vallaskozi-konferencian 
(Accessed on 26. 05. 2018)
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reformed or modernist approach in practice. The section on interfaith dialogue 
displays only a propaganda video,18 and events open to non-Muslims such as the 
World Hijab Day Hungary - A Kendő Világnapja have an implicit missionary purpose.19 
Identity, as perceived by the legal experts of the Hungarian Muslim 
Community, is based on “common faith, common history, common language, 
and common home (common homeland or common geographical location). In 
addition, there are less positive identity-forming elements such as common eco-
nomic interests or envisioning a common enemy.” The argument suggests that 
identity has various layers as well, of which “in Islam the most significant is 
undoubtedly faith that keeps the other elements in balance.” After detailing the 
primary principles of faith, the Muslim community is defined as “the best nation” 
and identity as “a map that brings us back to our real country (Paradise)”. In this 
reasoning the primacy of religion is explicit, nation is equated with faith commu-
nity, and homeland is substituted by a religious concept, Paradise. 
As a consequence, integration has no clear definition. The article says: “When 
a Muslim man integrates himself in the society in which he lives, preserving the 
principles of Islamic faith in his heart and embracing the Islamic lifestyle, and 
thus expresses the concept of Islamic identity.” This understanding envisions 
integration as making the sharia integral to the host society without any compro-
mise, flexibility or adapting to the non-Muslim majority context. Dr. Zoltán Sulok, 
president of the MME would begin the process of successful integration with the 
introduction of Islam to society so that Muslims are not regarded as aliens in the 
society (...)The integration of the majority of Muslims has been realized. The soci-
ety welcomed them. We should introduce ourselves to those who have prejudices 
against us. That is why we have publications and press events.” 20 In other words, 
Sulok upholds the view that the host society has to change and adapt to the Islam 
as presented to them, in this tactful communication has a key role, while reformist 
reading is not on the agenda. Sulok participates in events where he is called to 
spread the news about an allegedly non-radical version of Islam professed by his 
Organisation.21 As explained in what follows, Balázs Mihálffy’s reformist appro-
ach differs from this perception in depth.
2. Mihálffy’s approach and the predicament of sharia in Europe 
Balázs Mihálffy argues that at the root of current tensions and misunderstandings 
between Islam and Europe, is that doctrine and the law (sharia) are considered as 
inseparable in the hearts and minds of Muslims, at least according to the ortho-
18  Vallások közötti párbeszéd.  [Interfaith dialogue] http://iszlam.com/iszlam-az-elet-vallasa/iszlam-
es-nyugat/item/307-vallasok-kozotti-parbeszed (Accessed on 28. 05. 2018)
19  World Hijab Day Hungary - A Kendő Világnapja. http://iszlam.com/hirek/item/2482-world-hijab-
day-hungary-a-kendo-vilagnapja (Accessed on 27. 05. 2018)
20  Szentágotay 2011. 88-89.
21  http://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/egy-vallasos-magyar-muszlim-az-iszlam-alapjairol-sulok-zol-
tan-volt-keteg-szalon-vendege [A religious Hungarian Muslim on the foundations of Islam. Zoltán 
Sulok was guest of Keteg Salon]
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dox-dominated views of Islam based on legal-theological institutions, whether in 
Sunni or Shiite Islam. According to Mihálffy, doctrine and law are distinct issues 
and could be dealt with separately. As he puts it: 
Europe is not prepared to deal with such a mindset. For Muslims, free-
dom of religion means not only the freedom of spreading the doctrine and 
religious practice but also the freedom to apply the sharia. So, when we deal 
with the ḥalāl / ḥarām regulations we deal only with a sub-branch of the 
muʻāmalāt (transactions). Therefore, we cannot regulate or tackle any phen-
omenon of Muslim religiosity without a holistic perspective that concerns 
the entire system. This is the same with the concept of sin and infringement 
or offenses. There are certain actions that are contrary to the western legal 
norms but they are not considered as such by Islamic law or they are even 
praised. The growing ratio of Muslims in Europe poses the need to find a 
modus vivendi with them while maintaining the law and order of the state.22
A recent account by Lisbet Christoffersen and Jørgen S. Nielsen corroborates 
Mihálffy’s claim, and asserts that “for some sections of the Muslim communi-
ties in Europe, aspects of custom related in some way to Islam…remain so pers-
istent that for the legislator and the judge to ignore them is tantamount to insti-
tutionalizing severe injustice”.23 Conversely, Nilüfer Göle argues that everyday 
Muslims in Europe believe that Europe is a privileged framework because they 
are encouraged to live according to their conscience, by abandoning all references 
to sharia. Others created a limited theory of sharia, a sort of minimalist orthodoxy, 
by limiting Islamic legislation to cult practices (ʻibādāt) and moral principles (akh-
lāq)”.24 She interviewed a couple of young Muslims in Switzerland in whose life, 
as she puts it “sharia does not take up a large place as a legal system and even less 
as a penal code… in a self-confident way, and even with some pride, they affirm 
their feeling of belonging to the European cultural area, even more so as they dis-
tance themselves from sharia”25. These two accounts summarise quite well the cle-
avage of interpretations of sharia among Muslims in Europe, and the complexity 
of Muslim appropriations of sharia.
3. An ecumenical sharia for Europe?
For Balázs Mihálffy, the solution for this predicament can be found in the consi-
deration of sharia as a flexible system, which, according to him, has always been 
flexible. As he argues:
22  Interview with Balázs Mihálffy.
23  Christoffersen and Nielsen 2009. xiii.
24  Göle 2017. 85.
25  Göle 2017. 85-86.
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If we look at the development of the sharia in the various parts of the 
growing Islamic empire, we find that it incorporated in itself a great number 
of elements from the local customary law and Islamified them. Therefore, 
sharia is adaptable. It was one of the conditions that allowed Islam to put 
down roots from Central Asia to the Iberian Peninsula as well as in the 
Far East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even today when Muslims from diffe-
rent parts of the world meet, they realize that not only legal schools divide 
them but their local customs as well, most of which are abiding as if they 
were part of the sharia. Until 1924, the fall of the caliphate, this comple-
xity was managed by the allegiance to the central religious authority, even 
if nominal. Ever since the abolishment of the caliphate the Muslim psy-
che has suffered from the duality resulting from the separation of doctrine 
and law. In this context, in their understanding, the freedom of religion in 
the West offers a unique opportunity to restore the desired unity. This is a 
menace in as much as the West cannot get control of it. The common belief 
in this regard is: either secularism, or Islam, since they have no common 
ground. However, rather than imposing an enforced choice – which usu-
ally provokes more antagonism towards the secular order – Europe should 
set the frame by elaborating a new Islamic law which is based on harmo-
nisation with the European legal system. Unfortunately, it seems that we 
cannot expect this process to be done by Muslim religious experts. It has to 
be prepared and offered – I mean here making it obligatory – by Western 
legal experts. Western law is much more developed and has to show the 
path of adapting sharia.26
We asked Balázs Mihálffy whether his call to Western lawyers to adapt sharia for 
Muslims and Europe has so far generated any reactions, especially in Hungary. 
He said that he received two kinds of reactions. On the one hand, he faced a 
faced disinterest by some lawyers who, in his view, were too narrow-minded to 
see the importance of the matter. Others, however, including the ex-president of 
Hungary László Sólyom (President of Hungary from 2005 to 2010), an interna-
tionally acknowledged expert of constitutional law, were quite open, and found 
his idea of incorporating some elements of sharia into the legal systems of Europe 
as worth further consideration after a harmonisation process. There are prece-
dents for this logic in some countries such as South Africa which took into account 
African customs in shaping a new law for the republic after the end of apartheid 
in early 1990s.
The question of the place of sharia law in European legal systems has been 
recurrent in the recent debates in Europe. Lorenzo Zucca, in his A Secular Europe: 
Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape offers one of the most 
extensive discussions of the subject. He maintains that “the place of sharia law 
in European political societies varies. It is incorrect to believe that we can simply 
turn a blind eye to religious laws or to treat them as irrelevant. They are very rele-
vant for a growing number of people, and secular states want to be able to moni-
26  Interview with Balázs Mihálffy.
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tor the way in which religious norms affect the lives of people”.27 Zucca discusses 
four models of interaction between sharia and European legal systems: “total legal 
indifference towards religious norms, possible ways of accommodating religious 
norms into the ordinary legal system, the possibility of multiple jurisdictions of 
religious and non-religious kinds and the parallel legal systems whereby religi-
ous norms have a life independent from secular norms”.28
What is overlooked in this account, and in many other studies, is the very 
nature of sharia for its proponents. The claims of sharia are diffused and embra-
ced by Islamist activists whose project lies not only in the making of a reasonable 
accommodation over sharia, assuming that such accommodation is acceptable for 
them and for European lawyers, but aims at an integral socio-political system 
they believe should be applied in the European societies, supported by religious 
clerics who benefit from sponsoring an extended version of sharia. The supporters 
of sharia do not consider it to be shaped by public interest and botched up legis-
lation by elected people, who can change it. For them, sharia is divine in essence. 
Balázs Mihálffy does not believe in this Islamist view of sharia and thinks that 
sharia is flexible enough to adapt as circumstances change. He mistrusts two types 
of proponents of sharia currently widespread in Europe. First, the radical, funda-
mentalist interpreters of Islam whom he accuses of greed, fanaticism, backward-
ness and ignorance. In his view, the fatwas they deliver serve “business” interests 
they try to maintain and, therefore, he considers them as agents of blind conser-
vativism, extremism, and obscurantism. Second, Mihálffy distrusts the Muslim 
Brotherhood offshoots everywhere, which he considers to be part of a global poli-
tical Islamist strategy, funded by Gulf countries, and determined to install Islamic 
societies in Europe.
As far as the process of accommodating sharia in Europe is concerned, Mihálffy 
believes it is similar to:
Linguistic interpretation: conveying ideas in the language of the other. 
Enforcing secular law through the sharia, in a scientific and systematic man-
ner. In practice, we have to differentiate between legislation, jurisdiction 
and arbitration. Legislation refers to the national law-making process of 
Parliament. In this, sharia cannot have any scope, it cannot influence natio-
nal legislation. In the field of jurisdiction, a legal court, maḥkama sharʻiyya 
can be set up where the harmonised law is in fact applied. The third layer 
is that of arbitration that refers to the private sphere where certain cus-
toms and traditions can be maintained. The host society has to be prepa-
red to provide the structure to which they have to adapt. The structure 
must be called Islamic with proper legal and Muslim references in order 
to be accepted by Muslims but containing only those elements that are in 
accordance with the European law, as well as the principles of Western law 
based on the reformist interpretation of Islamic scriptures.29
27  Zucca 2012. 119.
28  Zucca 2012. 132-133.
29  Interview with Balázs Mihálffy.
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Mihálffy suggests a diversification of legal tools to allow various layers of 
“sharia-embedded-as-law” or “law-embedded-as-sharia” in the European legal 
systems. As in any legal system, legislation and jurisdiction can overlap or even 
conflict. Here two questions have to be answered. First, whether the decrees 
issued by the legislative authority on matters of religious importance – such as 
euthanasia – can be accommodated in the sharia law or not. Second, whether, 
assuming that such accommodation is achievable, it could be persuasive to the 
large Muslim communities or not. 
Beyond such legal conflicts, the very idea that a society should revise and 
adapt its laws to a particular religion in order to persuade its believers to embrace 
national law is not in line with the European legal traditions and social standards. 
One argument that we often heard from different European interlocutors is that 
Europe cannot adapt itself each time to a newly-arriving religion, because, as a 
matter of fact, Europe adopted for centuries secular laws and expects the new-
comers to synchronize their religious laws with the secular laws at work. This 
perception is also related to the belief that laws stem from public conventions and 
they are inherent to the sum of interests of a nation. While many Europeans we 
talked to are willing to accept that sharia could prevail in private matters, and even 
in the economy, they definitely oppose any presence of sharia in the public sphere, 
intended as the space of social and political interaction, for whatsoever reason, 
and indeed they oppose any other form of religious law in the public space. 
Mihálffy’s proposal needs to be contextualized both in the Hungarian cont-
ext and in the wider European context. With regard to the Hungarian context, 
Mihálffy believes that the current policy of Hungary in terms of migration is focu-
sed on the strategy of fighting mass migration while, in his view, there should be 
an accompanying, proactive strategy of integrating Muslims in countries where 
they exist in large numbers. His assessment of the Hungarian Muslim commu-
nities is no less permissive. He thinks that these communities are embryonic, in 
terms of their numbers and their projects, and are far from engaging in a reflection 
on sharia. It is, therefore, a matter of quest for horizon, very limited in Hungary, 
which pushes Mihálffy to look to the wider European context.
Yet, aside from the negative image of sharia in European public opinions, 
European institutions are not particularly welcoming to sharia. For example, the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that “sharia clearly diverges from the 
European Convention of Human Rights’ values”.30 At best, some European count-
ries recognise the role of sharia in family law (marriage and divorce in particular) 
contracted in the countries of origin or subject to arbitration in the host societies, 
and in recent times, Islamic finance. Thus, a Pakistani couple in England might 
be divorced in accordance with Pakistani (Muslim) family law.31 This is the main 
role of the sharia councils in the UK which deal with family matters, and divorce 
in particular.32
30  Berger 2013. 7. 
31  Berger 2013. 10.
32  Rohe 2015. 11.
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Mihálffy is aware that sharia has different interpretations adopted by the seve-
ral Muslim schools of law (currently seven living schools are functioning in the 
Muslim world). As he puts it “the schools of law are untenable. They belong to 
historical Islam not to classical Islam. Sharia should be sought in the classical 
sources because the schools of law brought only friction to Islam”.33 He accuses 
the muftis, the legal scholars of Islam who operate in Europe of being scholas-
tic, following their respective legal schools, without any ability to engage with 
European realities. We heard this same foundational discourse from Zoltán Sulok, 
the leader of the Organisation of Hungarian Muslims, the largest instance of 
Muslims in Hungary, as well. One recurrent difference between the discourse of 
Mihálffy on schools of law and that of the Organisation of Hungarian Muslims 
is that Mihálffy puts forward the Quran as the reference for rereading the sha-
ria while the Organisation of Hungarian Muslims insists on the prophetic tradi-
tion as the reference in law ( mainly because the Quran has very few legal inst-
ructions).34 As a consequence of this difference, the Organisation of Hungarian 
Muslims promotes a more traditionalist Islam while Mihálffy endorses an ecume-
nical-liberal Islam, although the two discourses share a belief in the same sources 
of sharia. Another difference is that while both discourses believe sharia is flexible, 
the Organisation of Hungarian Muslims trusts the Muslim clerics. Mihálffy, in 
all our conversations with him, avoids any statement regarding the current legal 
Muslim authorities.
4. Accounting anthropologically for “ecumenical sharia for Europe”
Similar to other discourses, practices, claims and appropriations of sharia in 
Europe, Mihálffy’s sharia project needs to be accounted for anthropologically to 
grasp its social and cultural meanings. A recent important discussion by Timothy 
P. Daniels paves the way to such understanding. Daniels suggests moving beyond 
the dichotomy of interpretive frameworks vs. discursive practice. The current 
debate in the anthropology of Islam opposes the constructivist narrative of interp-
retive frameworks which maintains that “the ideas, feelings, practices, interpreta-
tions, and discourses of Muslims are to be studied as Islams since there is no single 
real or essentialist Islam based in religious texts, Islamic history and the practices 
of exemplary individuals. These diverse kinds of Islam are produced in society, 
and embodied by individuals from various backgrounds”35. A second approach, 
championed by Talal Asad, claims that Islam is a discursive tradition that “inclu-
des and relates itself to the founding texts of the Quran and hadith. This hete-
rogeneous tradition has a past that articulates with present conditions, practices 
and institutions and instructs Muslims of the purposes and proper performance 
of practices”.36 Daniels proposes a synthesis that views “Islamic texts as embo-
33  Interview with Balázs Mihálffy.
34  Interview with Zoltán Sulok. conducted by the authors of the present article
35  Daniels 2017. 2.
36  Daniels 2017. 3.
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died with knowledge from which particular Muslims and collectivities construct 
diverse mental representations”.37 This approach could do justice to the impor-
tance of religious texts for believers in Islam, which makes Muslims today spe-
cific among religious believers.38. As he puts it “recognizing that the Quran and 
hadith and related textual sources embody knowledge is especially relevant to the 
study of sharia, because Muslims, directly or indirectly, look to these sources as a 
basis for the understandings of divine directives. Second, Muslims drawing upon 
knowledge embedded in religious texts, form diverse mental representations, cul-
tural models, and embodied practices, producing a variety of local Islams”.39
Sharia claims are certainly mental representations of a traditional knowledge 
embedded with specific norms (absoluteness, universality, etc.) as they are, at the 
same time, local productions of particular contexts and social agents. There is, 
however, a third variable to be taken into account in understanding the relevance 
of sharia claims today: that of moral economy. The latter answers the question of 
“why”, ignored by the two major narratives in the anthropology of Islam as well 
as by Daniels’ synthesis. Sharia claims are a capital believed to make social mirac-
les, for the community and for the elite that leads the way. These claims emerged 
in the Muslim world, within semi-urban populations frustrated by the failure of 
post-colonial “socialist” miracles, looking for a better life and a final miracle, tur-
ning to Islamist claims of sharia as the saviour. 
In Asia (including the Gulf countries), this moral economy as described by 
Patricia Sloane-White promotes “a version of Islam that is increasingly conser-
vative, financially and fiscally powerful, and committed to social control over 
Muslim and non-Muslim public and private lives.40 In Europe, marginalized 
Muslim populations came to believe in the same project, hoping it could bring 
about a favourable change in their social conditions. It is no surprise that the two 
most visible, debated and researched aspects of sharia in Europe are family law 
(the basic unit of moral economy) and Islamic finance. Thus, Mihálffy could be 
right in that sharia claims are expected to stay, if not to thrive, as they are an 
“authentic” resource of empowerment for Muslims in Europe, although very few 
non-Muslims would be persuaded to join the sharia claims (unless they see some 
benefit in it).
Another anthropological account of sharia claims in Europe could be labelled 
the pluralistic account, widely spread and endorsed by many scholars of Islamic 
law, especially by John Bowen, one of the leading anthropologists of Islam today. 
Bowen considers the social basis of sharia claims to be “the broad middle group of 
Muslims who are moderately conservative in their religious orientation… a broad 
middle group or ‘the community of the middle way”.41 He believes that in the 
British context, “being ‘ruled by shari‘a’ has become a sort of symbolic good thing 
for some Muslims”.42  Bowen mobilizes two other notions to account for sharia cla-
37  Daniels 2017. 3.
38  Daniels 2017. 4. 
39  Daniels 2017. 4.
40  Sloane-white 2017. 192. 
41  Bowen et al. 2013. 3.
42  Bowen et al. 2013. 7.
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ims. First, he mobilizes the notion of public interest, maṣlaḥa. As he puts it “here is 
an example of a step that would work to the benefit of Muslims, and since Islam is 
here to do that, then we should consider this question of maṣlaḥa, or social welfare 
or social benefit, as we think about the various decisions. So it is central, and it is 
a notion that many Muslims, including those who have expertise in the traditio-
nal fiqh, the jurisprudential tradition, apply all the time, often in combination with 
reasoning that is within their particular legal school”.43 
Second, Bowen has recourse to the liberal notion of public reasoning, “looking 
at actors drawing on different traditions, trying to converge on a set of goals – and 
here we go back to my general pragmatist approach to these issues – and who are 
coming at them from different normative stances. They indeed refer to divergent 
sets of norms, it may be human rights, it may be the texts of Islam, it may be par-
ticular laws in particular countries, Christian ethics or something else.”44
Our perspective of the moral economy, discussed above, resonates with 
Bowen’s idea about sharia as a symbolic good for the British Muslims, and the 
reasons that led to setting up a solid social basis for it within the Muslim commu-
nities. Furthermore, Mihálffy would agree with Bowen’s liberal public reasoning 
and the opportunity it provides to sharia-minded people to translate sharia terms 
and norms into a liberal legal discourse. It is the notion of maṣlaḥa which could be 
problematic, here. Mihálffy also uses this notion to render the meaning of public 
interest for all, not only for Muslims. It makes, however, no doubt for scholars 
of Islamic law that maṣlaḥa is understood by the majority of Muslim lawyers to 
be inherent to the law itself or consequent to it, and although it is a pragmatist 
notion, it does not mean that it directs law-making unless the traditions are silent 
over the matter at hand. This is an old debate, still unresolved in the Muslim 
world, between texts and interests, especially with regard to the eventual cont-
radiction between the two, and the possible options Muslims could have. Most 
Muslim lawyers would answer definitively that the priority should be given to 
the texts. This is not the outcome one would expect in a liberal democracy.
A third narrative may be classified as a cautious postmodernist narrative sug-
gested by Adam Possamai, a Belgian sociologist of religion. The latter advocates a 
“multi-faith pragmatic approach” to sharia in the West:
“between a traditional modernist and universal view of the law 
and a postmodern and legal pluralist view: that of a pragmatic mul-
tiple modernist project, recognising formal agreements and recom-
mendation for more accountability rather than for any formalised 
sub-legal institutions. This thesis of multiple modernities with reg-
ard to sharia and legal pluralism, progressed from simply admit-
ting that religion is part of the public sphere, to now attempting to 
understand what this means and what we are to do with this new 
social reality”.45
43  Bowen et al. 2013. 5.
44  Bowen et al. 2013. 15.
45  Possamai 2015. 300-301.
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Whereas a post-modern legal setting could be open to sharia claims, at least 
in specific matters, and within the scope of reasonable accommodations, the few 
voices of reformed sharia have not yet convinced the large sectors of Muslims to 
seriously engage with modernity. A recent article by the anthropologist Jonathan 
Benthall sees the solution for the problem of sharia in the West in “emulating 
Nineteenth Century Judaism in Europe. In the same vein Reform Judaism brought 
the modernist rabbis together around the ideas of acceptance of other religious 
perspectives, rejecting dietary restrictions and the idea of a Jewish nation in a 
favour of a religious community”.46 We could not avoid the comparison with 
Judaism as Mihálffy told us that so far the most enthusiastic reaction he had to his 
project came from eminent intellectuals in Israel. This reaction prompted him to 
pursue his rapprochement with the Jewish intellectuals, a perspective he did not 
think about while putting together his 2428-page Quran commentary. With this 
rapprochement, Mihálffy hopes to initiate a genuine ecumenism.
Conclusion
The purpose of the current paper was to determine the possibilities of ecumenism 
in the current Muslim landscape in Europe. The study has shown through the 
case of Balázs Mihálffy, a Hungarian Muslim intellectual, that a comprehensive 
reform project around a sharia claim can be both a resource for ecumenism as well 
as a limit to it. The research has also shown that a transnational life project with 
different religious platforms could sustain a claim of ecumenism. Overall, this 
study strengthens the idea that a reformed sharia necessitates a critical engage-
ment with the sources of Islam, a considerable will to transgress the moral and 
social precincts of the so-called Muslim communities in Europe, as well as a pre-
ference for everyday Islam over traditionalist Islam. Mihálffy uses selected tools 
of Islamic law and Western legal and political philosophy to foster his project: 
Quran commentary, diversification of legal tools, liberal public reasoning, etc. 
The most important limitation lies in the fact that Mihálffy faces obstacles in cre-
ating a network and gaining the support of the current legal Muslim authorities 
working in Europe, the majority of whom are traditionalist. He admits that these 
authorities, whether Sunni or Shiite, care more about political interests of their 
countries of origin and their scholastic traditions than about reforming sharia. 
Another limitation is the incapacity of Muslim Hungarians, in terms of structure 
and discourse to offer him the opportunity to carry on his reform project. Finally, 
his sharia-embedded-as-law or law-embedded-as-sharia could be ambiguous for 
European legal experts, coming from a tradition with a corpus and logic radically 
different from those the Muslim legal tradition puts forward in its sharia-claims.
46  Benthall 2015.
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